Research Study

International and Transnational Terrorism:
Diagnosis and Prognosis
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The primary goals of this study are to cast the problem of internationalized terror into clear perspective and to provide the reader with a framework for a more systematic grasp of the subject. Terrorism is, however, a particularly controversial and complex phenomenon. Hence, it must be emphasized that the approach adopted and the judgments advanced are those of the author, David L. Milbank. So, too, are the basic definitions. And although it is analytically useful for the purposes of this paper, the distinction made between international and transnational terrorism is bound to draw some critical comment—if only because the former term has acquired so broad a currency in academic and journalistic literature.

The statistics presented also break new ground. This is because the author was able to draw on a comprehensive new data bank called ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events) that was developed for the Office of Political Research by Edward F. Mickolus during the summer of 1975 as a related but separate project.

Despite this advantage, however, several words of caution about the figures and statistical inferences that are set forth in this study are in order. In the first place, there are many significant gaps in our knowledge about specific incidents and groups—and even those terrorist organizations and actions on which there is considerable reliable information do not always fit neatly into the typologies that have been created for them. Moreover, the universe of incidents under review is small enough that unintended omissions (of which there are undoubtedly many) or erroneous classification of borderline events could have a statistically significant impact.

Comments or questions concerning this study (which does not represent a CIA position) will be welcomed. They should be addressed to the Director, Political Research.
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SUMMARY AND KEY JUDGMENTS

I. DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this study, international and transnational terrorism are defined as follows:

Common Characteristics: The threat or use of violence for political purposes when (1) such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than its immediate victims, and (2) its ramifications transcend national boundaries (as a result, for example, of the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its locale, the identity of its institutional or human victims, its declared objectives, or the mechanics of its resolution).

International Terrorism: Such action when carried out by individuals or groups controlled by a sovereign state.

Transnational Terrorism: Such action when carried out by basically autonomous non-state actors, whether or not they enjoy some degree of support from sympathetic states.

II. THE PHENOMENA IN RETROSPECT

There has been a marked and enduring upsurge in transnational terrorism since 1967 that has been characterized by:

—A substantial increase in the number of terrorist groups involved as well as in the number of countries in which they are operating;

—A trend toward greater international contact and cooperation among terrorist groups;

—A trend toward bolder and more dramatic actions;

—The general popularity of American targets; and

—A number of significant regional differences in the intensity and nature of such violence.

This upsurge is attributable in part to the dynamics of the Middle East conflict, an imbroglio which affects the interests of a large number of nations and is attended by particularly deep-seated feelings of bitterness and frustration. But the problem of transnational terrorism
would not have mushroomed to its present dimensions were it not for
the concurrent convergence and acceleration of a number of changes in
the global environment that had begun to take shape much earlier, e.g.:

— The technological advances that have provided terrorists with
new mobility, new weaponry, and (through the introduction of
TV-capable satellite communications) the near certain prospect
that their more dramatic actions will receive prompt and world-
wide publicity;

— The growth, fed by modernizing change, of global and regional
ties, dependencies and obligations that have both provided
terrorists with a host of new and potentially highly disruptive
targets for attack (e.g., power grids and jumbo aircraft) and
fostered a reactive upsurge in nationalism and ethnicity;

— An increasingly permissive political environment born of the
challenge raised to the postwar order by the developing nations
of the Third World, the “maverick” Communist regimes,
various dissatisfied second rank powers, and a broad array of
social forces fired, with differing degrees of responsibility, by a
new sense of “social conscience”;

— The persistent if uneven behavior of those states, less than a
score in number, that have furnished practicing or potential
terrorists with funds, arms, training, documentation, and other
operational support; and

— Changes in the overall economic environment that have fanned
local dissidence and fed the communities of emigre workers that
can provide terrorists with cover, recruits, and various forms of
operational support.

There has not, however, been a parallel upsurge in international
terrorism. Although there has been a good deal of such activity
associated with the Middle East conflict over the past decade, the
dimensions of the problem are essentially no greater today than they
were in 1968.

Another significant difference stems from the fact that resort to
international terrorism is just as likely to result from calculations
concerning the relative efficacy of alternative methods of bringing
national power to bear in a given situation as from an outright dearth of
national resources. Hence, such behavior has not been the special
province of any particular category of state. In contrast, as an option
more congenial to urban than to rural groups, transnational terrorism
has been characteristically spawned by societies at a mid to advanced
stage of socio-economic development.
For its practitioners, terrorism's principal drawback is that its consequences are to a considerable degree unpredictable. As demonstrated in Jordan in 1970 and in Uruguay between 1970 and 1972, even what seem to be dramatic tactical successes can lead to strategic reverses of major proportions. All told, however, the record to date shows that the personal risks that have been incurred by international and transnational terrorists have been relatively low, and that their chances of achieving at least some of their near-term objectives have been strong. Moreover, because the impact of their activity has been magnified by the publicity it has received and by its interaction with other destabilizing trends and forces, its disruptive effects have been grossly disproportionate to the resources employed by the terrorists as well as to the actual damage done in terms of the cost to life and property.

With the exception of a number of bilateral agreements of proven utility (most notably the US-Cuban accord of 1973), the international response to terrorism has been relatively weak and ineffective. The principal obstacles to greater progress in this field have been the controversy over justifiable versus illegal political violence, a broad resistance to such further infringement of national sovereignty as would be implied in any inflexible curtailment of the right to grant political asylum, and a natural reluctance on the part of many states to commit themselves to any course of action that might invite retribution—either by terrorist groups or by states sympathetic to the terrorists' cause.

III. THE OUTLOOK

*International terrorism* seems unlikely to pose much more of a threat to world order or US interests in the decade ahead than it does today.

—Even in its currently rather fluid condition, the international system subjects states to a host of legal obligations and practical constraints that they can ignore only at considerable risk.

—The potential implications of the various state-sponsored terrorist incidents that have been associated with the Middle East conflict notwithstanding, it seems likely that the employment of terrorist groups in a surrogate warfare role will continue to be more the exception than the rule for some time to come.

Despite the potentially salutary impact of some recent or likely developments (including the tougher stance toward terrorists that has been adopted by a number of states and the probability that technical innovations in the security field will make terrorism a more risky affair), the outlook for *transnational terrorism* is considerably less
encouraging. Specifically, the following factors and trends hold promise of aggravating the problem:

—The combined effects of technological advance, modernizing social and economic change, and growing interdependence will probably generate further increases in (1) divisive ethnicity and nationalism, (2) urban unrest, (3) terrorist capabilities, and (4) societal vulnerabilities.

—The widespread erosion of established institutions of authority—manifested in multiple challenges to the postwar international order and the increasing difficulties of governance encountered at the national level—that has both invited and facilitated terrorist activity in recent years seems likely to persist throughout much of the decade ahead.

—Since the net thrust of the forces at work within the international community promises to remain more centrifugal than centripetal, it seems unlikely that efforts to combat terrorism through binding world-wide conventions will prove to be much more effective than in the past.

—The likelihood that (1) national liberation and leftist revolutionary formations will continue to receive both moral and material support from a wide variety of transnational and international organizations and (2) transnational contact and cooperation among terrorist groups will gain further momentum holds forth the ominous prospect of the emergence of a complex support base for transnational terrorist activity that is largely independent of—and quite resistant to control by—the state-centered international system.

—Under such circumstances, any governmental assistance rendered to terrorist groups could have an even more deleterious impact than in the past, for it would risk simply increasing the recipients’ potential for autonomous action.

—The problems of (1) extensive and sometime sympathetic publicity for terrorist acts and (2) the diffusion of terrorist-adaptable technological know-how are likely to persist in most parts of the world and thus to reinforce the risks associated with the wholesale deployment of sophisticated (and in many cases, man-portable) weaponry and the race to sell nuclear technology and modern armaments to developing countries.

The prospect of nuclear-armed terrorists can, in fact, no longer be dismissed. But because of the major problems that would be involved in the acquisition, storage, transport, and employment of a nuclear device, a more likely scenario—at least in the short term—would be a terrorist
seizure of a nuclear weapons storage facility or a nuclear power plant to exploit the publicity and the bargaining power inherent in the attendant threat of radiological pollution.

A more pressing threat, however, would seem to lie in the field of chemical, biological, and radiological agents of mass destruction. Not only are many of these agents relatively easy to acquire, but (because small—sometimes minute—quantities are usually all that are needed for potentially devastating effect) they also tend to be easy to conceal, easy to transport, and easy to introduce into the target area.

All told, transnational terrorism promises to pose a continuing and potentially gravely unsettling problem for the world community until such time—possibly years hence—that the international system gels into new and generally accepted contours. Although the frequency and intensity of violence in some current trouble spots will probably decline, it seems likely that:

—The overall number of terrorist groups engaged in transnational terrorist activity will, at best, remain at about the present level;

—The number of countries in which these groups are operating will increase;

—Because of their symbolic value, their availability, and the embarrassment they can create, the popularity of American targets will remain high;

—The world will witness steadily greater and more widespread sophistication in terrorist targetting, execution, and weaponry; and

—Although most terrorist groups will probably continue to be deterred by both moral considerations and calculations of the risks involved, the danger that a fanatic few might resort to weapons of mass destruction will increase accordingly.

IV. IMPLICATIONS

The phenomenon of widespread internationalized terror is not only likely to persist for at least the next several years, but also to evolve in ways that could pose a more substantial threat to US interests—and, under certain circumstances, to world order—than in the recent past.

—Whether or not weapons of mass destruction are actually brought into play, the odds are that the impact of transnational terror will be more sharply felt in the US in the years just ahead—primarily as the result of periodic increases in attacks on American targets abroad, but possibly through more frequent terrorist demands on the US Government and
occasional operations on US soil by foreign-based groups as well.

—Even if the problem of internationalized terror is not brought closer to home in the ways suggested above, it promises to impinge more directly on US interests and options with respect to a broad range of critical issue areas, including both East-West and North-South relations, the politically and economically sensitive questions of arms sales and the transfer of advanced technology, and the resolution of problems associated with the dependence of Western industrialized countries on foreign energy sources.

The importance of factors that are likely to affect the objective capabilities and options of terrorist groups in the years ahead is obvious. But in the final analysis, it is man’s subjective perception of “reality” that serves as the primary determinant of his political behavior. Hence, those variables (e.g., cultural heritage, credo, and changes in the overall political environment) that can shape or alter the prisms through which the terrorists concerned view the world around them will bear equal attention.

Indeed, although the dimensions of the threat posed by internationalized terror should not be overdrawn, the factors bearing on this phenomenon and its potential ramifications are so numerous and cut across so many jurisdictional and disciplinary lines that the development of more effective national and international countermeasures is likely to be a particularly demanding task. Sadly, there are no sure guidelines for endowing any given government’s approach to the problem of terrorism with the qualities required to meet this challenge. But while any number of alternative courses of action could prove equally effective, it bears emphasis that together with timely intelligence and sound multi-disciplinary analytical support, flexibility and extensive coordination (both intra- and inter-state) would seem to be critical to devising and implementing a counter-terrorism strategy that is both internally consistent and minimally disruptive to national values and foreign policy objectives in terms of “hidden” social, political, and economic costs.
THE DISCUSSION

I. THE OBJECTIVES AND BOUNDARIES OF INQUIRY

Political violence predates recorded history. As a distinctive form of political violence sporadically employed by rulers and ruled alike, terrorism is probably not much younger—although it owes its name and subsequent conceptual flowering to the French Reign of Terror (1793-1794). Nor is the spill-over of terrorist activity onto the international stage a particularly recent development: witness the stir caused by various anarchist groups operating in Europe and North America in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as well as by the behavior of a few of their more self-interested political contemporaries. Some 70 years ago, for example, a renegade Moroccan chieftain foreshadowed a tactic favored by a number of terrorist groups today by kidnapping two foreign businessmen (one English, the other of dubious American citizenship) in a successful effort to get England and the US to pressure France into forcing the Sultan to accede to a long list of demands—including a substantial ransom, the release of a large number of prisoners, the cession of two territorial districts, and the arrest of a few key enemies.

But despite historical precedents and parallels, modern-day terrorism is very much a function of our times. Advances in technology and growing world interdependence have afforded terrorists new mobility, new targets, new weaponry, and the near certain prospect that their more dramatic acts will receive prompt and world-wide publicity. Moreover, recent changes in the overall political and economic climate have provided terrorists with a somewhat more hospitable environment in which to operate.

Indeed, there has been such an upsurge of terrorist activity in recent years that some observers have warned that we may be entering a veritable age of terrorism. Among other things, there has been a marked increase in the number of active terrorist groups as well as in the number of countries in which they are operating. Internal and international cooperation among terrorist groups has also risen notably. There has been a trend toward bolder and more dramatic actions, with an accompanying escalation of casualties, damage, and demands. And most importantly, perhaps, there has been a quantum jump in terrorist incidents affecting the interests of more than one state.

Not surprisingly, these developments have generated unprecedented interest in terrorism as a subject for serious research and analysis. In sharp contrast with the situation which prevailed only a decade or so ago, existing literature—both open and classified—now offers a wide range of useful insights into the root causes, logic, and characteristic attributes of political terrorism as well as a substantial number of detailed case studies.

The trouble is that the picture which emerges is still confused and incomplete. For one thing, there is as yet no generally accepted definition of terrorism per se, much less of its international or transnational variants. For another, much of the work that has been done on terrorism suffers from the limiting effects of narrowly focused tactical concerns or of particularistic institutional and personal biases. And, largely because of these differing perspectives and priorities, little progress has been made toward development of a comprehensive and readily accessible data base. In short, we are still hard put to explain the current state of affairs or to venture firm predictions about the future.

Of necessity, therefore, this study is an exercise in both synthesis and innovation. It is confined to an examination of international and transnational terrorism as defined in Section II below (with primary emphasis on transnational terrorism as, in the short term at least, potentially the more injurious to US interests). Its principal underlying assumptions are three. The first is that the basic societal problems and tensions that can give rise to political violence—and thus to terrorism—are likely to prove particularly intractable in this era of rapid change, growing nationalism and ethnicity, and world-wide economic strains. Such irritants may, in fact, be treated as "givens" in the global environment for many years to come. The reader is forewarned that because of this, and because they have already received considerable
schorally attention, these factors will not be subjected
to extensive analysis here.*

Corollary to the above, it is assumed that the
potential for domestic, international, and
transnational terrorism will remain high in the decade
ahead and that the scope of the problem will therefore
depend primarily on factors affecting the
opportunities, alternatives, and behavioral constraints
faced by the group actors involved.

Finally, it is postulated that man's subjective
perception of "reality" serves as the primary
determinant of his political behavior. Hence, without
neglecting the many factors that have affected—or
that may affect—the objective capabilities and options
of terrorist groups, this paper repeatedly draws
attention to those variables (e.g., cultural heritage,
credo, and changes in the overall political
environment) that can shape or alter the prisms
through which the terrorists concerned view the world
around them.

Broadly stated, the objectives of the study are to
gain a better understanding of the dynamics and
consequences of international and transnational
terrorism since 1965, to identify those factors likely to
promote or inhibit such activity in the years ahead,
and to assess the implications of these findings with
respect to US policies and interests. Such goals
preclude any effort to gauge the extent of the threat
posed to US interests and world order by any
particular terrorist group or consortium. Given the
host of variables that would have to be considered,
that task must remain the province of traditional and
painstaking case-by-case analysis. It is hoped,
however, that the substantive generalizations and
methodological techniques that are set forth below
will provide a valuable frame of reference for more
definitive treatments of specific aspects of the
terrorism problem.

II. ESTABLISHING AN ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK

Definitions

As a first step, it is necessary to cut through some
of the semantic and value-generated fog which currently
surrounds the concept of terrorism and to spell out
precisely what sort of behavior falls within the purview
of this study. In part, the existing confusion is
attributable to journalistic license and a popular
tendency to label terrorist a host of acts in which the
element of terror is clearly incidental to other and
more pressing objectives. But, as amply illustrated by
the tortured and fruitless efforts of a 35-member ad
hoc UN committee to define (and thereby, in effect, to
outlaw) international terrorism not long ago, the heart
of the problem lies in differing moral perspectives and
priorities.** Simply stated, one man's terrorist is
another man's freedom fighter.

Since terrorism always involves the deliberate
breach of generally accepted bounds for individual
or collective violence, it is difficult to define in totally
value-free terms. Nevertheless, it can be set in a
relatively rigorous and objective perspective. A good
way to begin is by quoting a perceptive description of
the characteristic attributes of terrorism by one of the
leading specialists on the subject.

The threat of violence, individual acts of violence, or a
campaign of violence designed primarily to instill fear—
to terrorize—may be called terrorism. Terrorism is violence for
effect: not only, and sometimes not at all, for the effect on the
actual victims of the terrorists. In fact, the victim may be
totally unrelated to the terrorists’ cause. Terrorism is violence
aimed at the people watching. Fear is the intended effect, not
the byproduct, of terrorism. That, at least, distinguishes
terrorist tactics from mugging and other forms of violent
ingrime that may terrify but are not terrorism.**

Political terrorism, then, is the above sort of
violence employed in pursuit of political objectives. It
is, as claimed by its practitioners, “propaganda of the
deed.” It is calculated violence aimed at influencing
the attitude and behavior of one or more target
audiences. Its proximate objectives may include
publicity, coercion, extortion, disorientation and
despair, provocation of unpopular countermeasures,
and (with regard to the terrorists themselves) morale-
building. Its ultimate goals can be either concrete
(e.g., the seizure or consolidation of political power or

*The committee, which met in New York from 16 July to 11 August
1973, was also unable to reach agreement on either the causes of
international terrorism or on measures which might be taken to prevent
such activity. In consequence, its report was simply a compendium of
disparate and conflicting views. To date, neither the UN General
Assembly nor the Sixth Committee thereof has been able (or willing) to
find time to consider it.

**Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of
Conflict, Research Paper No. 48, California Seminar on Arms
Control and Foreign Policy (Los Angeles: Crescent Publications,
the attainment of ethnic self-rule) or nebulous (e.g.,
the fomenting of world-wide revolution).*

The foregoing observations and generalizations
form the basis for the definitions of international and
transnational terrorism that are employed in this
study. These are as follows:

—**Common Characteristics:** The threat or use of
violence for political purposes when (1) such
action is intended to influence the attitudes and
behavior of a target group wider than its
immediate victims, and (2) its ramifications
transcend national boundaries (as a result, for
example, of the nationality or foreign ties of its
perpetrators, its locale, the identity of its
institutional or human victims, its declared
objectives, or the mechanics of its resolution).

—**International Terrorism:** Such action when
carried out by individuals or groups controlled by
a sovereign state.

—**Transnational Terrorism:** Such action when
carried out by basically autonomous non-state
actors, whether or not they enjoy some degree of
support from sympathetic states.**

Just how meaningful the posited distinction between
international and transnational terrorism is likely to
be in the longer run is, of course, open to question. But

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*In his chapter entitled "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation"
in *Internal War: Problems and Approaches* (edited by Harry
Eckstein and published by Collier-Macmillan Ltd., London, in
1964). Thomas P. Thornton defines political terror as "a symbolic
act designed to influence political behavior by extraordinary means,
entailing the use or threat of violence." Other particularly useful
general analyses of political terrorism are to be found in Brian
Smith, 1972); Brian Crozier, ed., *Annual of Power and Conflict,
1972-73* and *1973-74* (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict);
Paul Wilkinson, *Political Terrorism* (London: Macmillan, 1974);
Martha C. Hutchinson, "The Concept of Revolutionary
Terrorism," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume XVI,
Number 3*, September 1972, pp. 383-396; and Philip A. Karber,
The last-named author stresses the symbolic qualities of political
terrorism and suggests that it can be analyzed in much the same
fashion as other mediums of communication.

**Given the element of governmental patronage that is common to
both, the boundary line between transnational and international
terrorism is often difficult to draw. To the degree that it can be
determined, the key distinction lies in who is calling the shots with
respect to a given action or campaign. Hence, groups can and do drift
back and forth across the line. For example, even a one-time "contract
job" undertaken on behalf of a governmental actor by a group that
normally acts according to its own lights qualifies as international
terrorism.

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for the time being, at least, the two phenomena do
pose questions and problems of a qualitatively
different order. For one thing, since it involves the
behavior of state actors, international terrorism can in
theory be handled and contained within the
framework of the existing international system with
only minor adjustments. Moreover, its practitioners
seem to be somewhat fewer—or, with a few notable
exceptions, at least more restrained—than at some
other points of time in the recent past. Transnational
terrorism, on the other hand, has been growing in both
geographic scope and intensity. And the international
system is still ill-equipped to deal with autonomous
non-state actors.

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**Method**

At best, discussions of methodology carry the risk
of blurring and diluting the analytical thrust of a
research paper. But the subject at hand presents
something of a special case—one in which a few words
about the analytical techniques employed are needed
to lay the groundwork for subsequent discussion. For
one thing the myriad of factors which bear on terrorist
activity dictated adoption of a multi-disciplinary
approach. For another, the fuzzy boundaries that
separate terrorism from other forms of violence—and
the previously cited lack of any generally accepted
analytical approach or comprehensive and logically
organized data base—required the construction of a
relatively detailed framework for screening and
ordering the available information.

Briefly, a number of working hypotheses derived
from a survey of the existing literature on both
terrorism and political violence *per se* were used to
generate a list of (1) key group and environmental
variables that appear to have affected the scope,
nature, and intensity of international and
transnational terrorism in recent years, and (2)
analytically useful event characteristics. (Those initial
hypotheses that survived subsequent testing appear,
together with later additions, as judgments and
conclusions at various points in this study.)

The resultant tabulation is presented in somewhat
abbreviated form at Appendix A. It will be noted that,
in addition to fulfilling their primary (and distinctly
traditional) disciplinary function, most of the
variables listed therein are amenable to machine
processing and manipulation. And while, as suggested
in the Foreword, the statistical inferences that are
highlighted below rest on sometimes rather rudimen-
tary data, they can—and did—serve to refine some of
the author's preliminary assumptions and hypotheses and to suggest other trends and patterns that could be significant.

III. THE PHENOMENA IN RETROSPECT

What, Where, and When?

As previously indicated, international and transnational terrorism were not yet matters of much official or academic concern in 1965. In contrast to other forms of political violence, there simply had not been very much of either since the close of World War II—at least not of the sort that made headlines. Moreover, much of what there was had been associated with—and overshadowed by the more important consequences of—clear-cut adversary relationships stemming from either the Cold War or the anti-colonial struggle. For the most part, noncombatant third parties had been left unmolested.

It is true, of course, that two brief flurries of skyjacking had already drawn attention to a potential new problem area. But, for the most part, neither had involved more than a few actions that would be classified as terrorism under the definition employed here. The first, in the early 50s, had been comprised almost entirely of Eastern European aircraft commandeered for the sole purpose of escape to the West. And while the second, which extended from the late 50s to the early 60s, had been climaxed by the first postwar hijackings of American airliners (thereby prompting the US to press for a comprehensive international convention covering crimes committed on civilian aircraft engaged in international aviation), it too had been attributable primarily to individuals seeking personal advantage—a.k.a., expedient transport to or from Cuba or outright extortion—rather than political leverage or impact.

In any event, skyjackings tapered off again in 1963. The overall level of international and transnational terrorist activity remained relatively low through 1966, then turned upward against the backdrop of intensified Palestinian guerrilla activity that preceded the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Admittedly, the record up to that point is sketchy. For one thing, the mass media still lacked either the incentive or the technical means for systematic and comprehensive coverage of terrorist incidents—and many undoubtedly went unreported. But even if Figure 1 below substantially understates the number of international and transnational terrorist incidents that occurred in the 1965-1967 period, the international impact of such activity was negligible. Indeed, when the qualitative dimension is added in, 1968 emerges as a watershed year. At that juncture, a combination of Palestinian initiatives and the cumulative impact of the broader environmental trends discussed below seems to have finally sensitized dissident groups throughout the world to their latent and growing potential for effective transnational terrorist activity.

From 1 January 1968 through 31 December 1975, there were at least 913 recorded international and transnational terrorist incidents.* Of these, 123 were kidnappings; 31 were barricade and hostage episodes; 375 entailed the use of explosive devices of one type or another; 95 were armed assaults or ambushes; 137 involved the hijacking of an aircraft or other means of transportation; 59 fell under the category of incendiary attack or arson; 48 constituted assassination or murder; and 45 were characterized by other forms of violence. All told, more than 140 terrorist organizations—including a number of fictional entities created to shield the identity of the perpetrators of some particularly shocking or politically sensitive acts—from nearly 50 different countries or disputed territories (e.g., Palestine) have thus far been linked to this activity, and there may have been more.**

Figure 2 portrays the overall geographic distribution of international and transnational terrorist incidents for the 1965-1975 period. A more informative breakdown of 1968-1975 statistics by type of event and other operational criteria is provided in Appendix C.

Despite the widespread and continuing popularity of certain “traditional” forms of violence (e.g., assassinations and highly discriminate bombings), the picture which emerges from these assorted charts and tables underscores a number of marked regional and time-related variations in the frequency and nature of transnational terrorist incidents.*** Sub-Saharan Africa and large parts of Asia have, for example,

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*This figure excludes terrorist attacks on US and allied personnel and installations in Indochina. It also excludes most of the mutual assassination efforts and cross-border operations associated with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The only exceptions in this regard are incidents that either victimized noncombatant nationals of states outside the principal arena of conflict or were of such a nature that they became the object of international controversy.

**There are relatively few political groups in the world that are totally dedicated to terrorist violence. As used here, the term terrorist organization simply denotes a group that has employed terrorist tactics.

***Although international and transnational terrorist incidents are lumped together in these charts, the former were outnumbered by the latter by more than 20 to 1 and thus had little impact on the patterns reflected therein.
International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents
Figure 2
Geographic Distribution of International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents, 1965-75

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transregional</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific and Australia</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR/Eastern Europe</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western and NATO Europe</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>951</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

been relatively free of such activity. So too has the Soviet/East European region. Latin Americans have demonstrated a particular affinity for kidnapping foreign diplomats and businessmen. On the other hand, except for skyjackings, seemingly indiscriminate and potentially bloody spectaculars—e.g., mass hostage episodes, large bombs in public places, Lod Airport type massacres of innocent bystanders, and the destruction (or attempted destruction) without warning of passenger-carrying aircraft—have most frequently been the province of extremist formations from the Middle East, Europe, and Japan.

For its part, skyjacking reached near epidemic proportions in 1970 only to taper off sharply thereafter. There were, in fact, fewer recorded terrorist skyjackings in all of 1975 than there were in an average month just five years earlier. The dramatic decline in popularity of this particular form of terrorist violence has, however, been partially offset by a rise in equally unsettling barricade and hostage episodes.

Another point brought home by the data presented in Appendix B is that although transnational terrorists have, until recently at least, rarely sought to wring concessions from Washington, American targets—whether human or physical, official or private—have consistently been among the most popular for attack. For example, between mid-1969 and early 1973 (when tightened security and the implications of the US-Cuba agreement made American planes seem less attractive), US aircraft figured in about 30 percent of all skyjackings. Moreover, this ratio is relatively modest in comparison to US experience with some other forms of terrorist activity, especially kidnapping. Indeed, the available data suggests that over the past eight years, US citizens or US facilities have been victimized in at least one-third of all transnational terrorist incidents.

The hard fact is that substantial pockets of popular opinion in many parts of the world are prone to identify the US with reaction, intervention, and "neo-colonial" exploitation. Hence, American targets have a high symbolic value for "anti-imperialists" of both
A Classic Example of the Threat to Americans Abroad

On 4 August 1975, a group of Japanese Red Army terrorists seized the adjoining offices of the US Embassy's consular section and the Swedish Embassy in Kuala Lumpur in a successful bid to secure the release of several other terrorists who were then in Japanese custody. The photo shows some of the hostage diplomats being herded onto a bus bound for the waiting JAL jetliner that eventually carried the JRA gunmen and their newly freed compatriots to Libya.

nationalistic and ideological persuasion. Moreover, such targets also tend to have a high "embarrassment quotient" in relation to the governments of the countries in which the attacks occur and, if different, the governments against which the terrorists levy their demands.

Despite their summary nature, the group profiles set forth in Appendix C serve, in part, to document the three additional trends—beginning with the proliferation of active terrorist groups in recent years—that were cited as particularly significant at the outset of this study. For example, even though the criteria employed for selecting the groups included in Appendix C (relative levels of activity or prominence) tended to favor long-lived formations, the majority of the organizations listed therein are less than eight years old. Less evident from the profiles but perhaps more significant is the instability and ephemeral quality that have been characteristic of many if not most of the organizations that have engaged in transnational terrorism over the past decade. The net growth in their numbers has, in fact, been as much attributable to the splintering of old groups as to the emergence of entirely new ones.

The next-mentioned trend—that toward bolder actions—has been uneven. Moreover, its precise contours defy precise definition for they depend on unavoidably subjective judgments concerning the relative difficulty, risk, and shock value associated with often quite dissimilar incidents. Nevertheless, the inherent dynamics and logic of a campaign of terrorist violence are such that it has a natural propensity to escalate over time. Globally, this has found reflection in the adoption and spread of aggressive new tactics. Locally, it has been manifested in the tendency of
certain groups to probe the effective limits of any such innovation that they elect to employ before scaling back on its use or on their associated demands. Thus we have witnessed:

— the multiple skyjacking operation staged by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in September 1970 which capped the wave of aircraft seizures that had begun two years earlier.*

— the all time record for multiple and cumulative diplomatic kidappings established by the Tupamaros between mid-1970 and early 1971 in their effort to secure the release of about 150 imprisoned collaborators; and

— the escalation of the amount of ransom demanded by Argentine terrorists for the release of kidnapped multinational corporation executives from $62,500 in 1971 to a reported figure of over $60 million in 1975.**

Because of the complexity of the relationships involved, the sensitive nature of much of the available information, and the questions which are raised with respect to the past and present role of various state actors, the third trend—that toward more extensive international cooperation among terrorist groups—deserves detailed examination in a separate research study. Indeed, although a number of notations concerning known or suspected transnational links have been included in the material presented in Appendix C, the broad scope of this paper precludes more than a brief overview of the problem.

So far, at least, the efforts of various terrorist groups to promote broad regional and inter-regional coordination through the holding of periodic conferences and the formation of such umbrella organizations as Latin America's Revolutionary Coordination Junta (JCR) seem to have generated more smoke than fire.* But at a lower level, a growing network of overlapping ad hoc alliances and mutual assistance arrangements have added an ominous new dimension to the terrorist threat.

Although terrorist groups in the Western Hemisphere seem to have been entering the picture more often of late, this phenomenon has been most evident in Europe and the Middle East where the advantages that can be derived from transnational cooperation have brought together some strange bedfellows indeed. For example, support rendered by individuals associated with the anarchist Baader-Meinhof Gang facilitated preparations for the attack on the Israeli Olympic team which was staged by the extremist but relatively non-revolutionary Palestinian Black September Organization in the fall of 1972. Not only have the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Japanese Red Army (JRA) teamed up in a number of dramatic ventures, but—as suggested by the fact that the three Japanese gunmen who executed the Lod Airport massacre in May 1972 carried papers forged in Germany and weapons that they had picked up in Italy—both organizations have received assistance from a number of other terrorist groups in various parts of the world. The Turkish People's Liberation Army has used Palestinian training camp facilities in Syria and has reciprocated by attacking Israeli targets in Turkey. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) has developed links with a number of terrorist organizations outside the UK and Northern Ireland, including separatist groups in France and Spain as well as some Palestinian formations in the Middle East.

Overall, more and more groups throughout the area have begun providing each other with arms, safe housing, and other forms of support. In fact, there is evidence that a European-based terrorist "service industry" has emerged in the form of organizations devoted primarily or exclusively to providing training, documentation, and other specialized assistance to revolutionary and national liberation movements in all corners of the world. Just how complicated this web of interrelationships has become is well illustrated by France's celebrated—but still murky—"Carlos Affair" and its recent dramatic sequel in Vienna (see pages 16-17).

*See photo on p. 13. In a series of well-coordinated actions (all but one of which were staged during the course of a single day: 6 September 1970), the PFLP hijacked four airliners and attempted to seize a fifth. One plane was flown to Cairo, where it was destroyed as soon as the passengers and crew had disembarked. The other three aircraft were diverted to a landing strip in the Jordanian desert. These were blown up on 12 September, but some of their passengers were held hostage for another 13 to 18 days.

**In the latter case, the Montoneros organization kidnapped Jorge and Juan Born, co-owners and directors of Bunge and Born Ltd., in September 1974 and held them for nine months. An additional condition for their release—which also was met—was the publication in several leading Western papers of a full page political "announcement" drawn up by their captors (see Figure 3).

The JCR is composed of Argentina's Revolutionary People's Army (ERP), Bolivia's National Liberation Army (ELN), Chile's Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), Paraguay's National Liberation Front (FREPALINA), and the remnants of Uruguay's National Liberation Movement (MLN/Tupamaros). Backed by the ERP's overflowing coffers, it has grown more active in recent months and has the potential for becoming an effective and dangerous organization.
Burge and Borne Ltd. wishes to clarify that it has been forced to publish this announcement by the imposition of the Organization which holds in its power the executions of Jorge and Juan Born. In no circumstances should its publication be deemed to imply agreement with its content.

In relation to the judgment made by the Organization against the company, the following clarifications are in order:

1. The company is in no way a political entity and will not comment on the matter.
2. The company will continue to operate in accordance with its stated policies and principles, and will not be influenced by external pressures.
3. The company reserves the right to take legal action against any party that attempts to interfere with its operations.

Jorge and Juan Born have been sentenced to death by the Organization.

The notice inserted in the Washington Post by Burge and Born Ltd. as a condition for the release of Jorge and Juan Born.
THE SAGA OF CARLOS

Guided by a Lebanese guerrilla-turned-informer named Michel Moukarbel, three French counterintelligence agents in Paris attempted to bring in a suspected terrorist—a man known to them only by his cover name of Carlos—for questioning on the evening of 27 June 1975. Inexplicably, they were unarmed. Carlos was not. He escaped in a blaze of gunfire that left Moukarbel and two of the French security officers dead at the scene. The third French agent was gravely wounded.

A French police photo of Carlos in Paris

Carlos vanished—leaving a thoroughly shaken French security service behind him—only to reappear as the leader of the group of terrorists that successfully took almost all the delegates to an OPEC ministerial-level conference in Vienna hostage on 21 December 1975. He remains something of a man of mystery. But during the months between his hasty exit from Paris and his dramatic return to the limelight, enough evidence documenting—or hinting at—remarkably extensive terrorist activities and connections was uncovered to make him seem like a real life “Jackal.” The first piece in the jigsaw puzzle was furnished by a chance break in London that enabled the British to identify Carlos as Illich Ramirez-Sanchez, the 25-year-old son of a wealthy and staunchly Communist Venezuelan lawyer who had dispatched his family to London in 1966.

Carlos’ early political career was highlighted by a brief stint at the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow—from whence he was reportedly expelled for dissolute living and improper attitudes in early 1970. Little is known of Carlos’ movements in the wake of his unscheduled departure from the USSR. In any event, more than a year was to pass before he returned to London, and he apparently spent at least part of this period in the Middle East. At some point in the early 1970s, he became a member of the extensive terrorist network operated by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)—a fact openly acknowledged by a PFLP spokesman in July 1975 with the boastful addition that Carlos and Moukarbel had been planning a series of dramatic new actions when the French authorities finally closed in on them.

Painstaking investigation of Carlos’ known associates subsequently revealed that, in addition to Moukarbel (described by the PFLP as its “Paris paymaster”), he had been working with a mixed entourage of dedicated revolutionaries that included several Latin Americans. One of the latter has been further identified as a member of the secretariat of the Colombian Communist Party. Carlos had also been provided with shelter and other helpful services by a number of women friends, including at least two European nationals, who probably had little knowledge of what he was really doing.

Charged, in general terms, with striking at “Zionism and imperialism,” the Carlos organization had apparently been given latitude to operate over a wide geographic area embracing not only the UK and much of Continental Europe but, according to plans recovered by British authorities, parts of the Middle East as well. Moreover, evidence in the form of records that had been maintained by Moukarbel and the nature of some of the weapons that Carlos had left for safekeeping with friends in England and France established that the group had been cooperating, in keeping with PFLP policy, with a number of other terrorist groups—most notably the Japanese Red Army (JRA) and the German Baader-Meinhof Gang. It now seems certain, for example, that Carlos and Moukarbel were deeply involved in the planning of the JRA seizure of the French Embassy in The Hague in September 1974.
But Cuban officials had been maintaining contact with members of the Carlos group in both England and France, and the French were sufficiently suspicious of this activity to send three of Havana's diplomats packing in the wake of Carlos' escape.

Since 1974, at least, the group that Carlos had headed in Paris had generally identified itself as the "Mohammed Boudia Commando." When he reappeared in Vienna in December 1975, it was at the head of a seemingly new formation with a different name (the "Arm of the Arab Revolution") and, possibly, a different principal sponsor. (The PFLP has denied responsibility for the OPEC operation; so too has Libya, but the Egyptians, among others, have openly accused Colonel Qaddafi of being behind it.) In any event, the composition of Carlos' Vienna attack force (believed to have consisted, in addition to its Venezuelan leader, of two Germans and three Palestinians) provided solid new evidence of the trend toward closer cooperation among terrorists of different nationalities.

As of this writing, Carlos' whereabouts are again unknown. Nor are the returns on his December venture as yet all in. It remains to be seen, for example, just what new international measures—if any—will result from that action. Nevertheless, the immediate outcome of Carlos' OPEC operation (including safe haven for the terrorists and massive publicity for their objectives)—coupled with his boast that he currently controls some two-score seasoned professionals—suggests that the world will hear from him again before too long.

Other headline incidents to which Carlos has been linked since his near arrest in France include an assassination attempt against J. Edward Sieff (a prominent English Jew and clothing-store magnate) in December 1973; the bombing of a popular Paris Left Bank hangout, Le Drugstore, in 1974; two attacks against El Al aircraft at Orly Airport in January 1975; and an assassination attempt against a Yugoslav consular official in Lyons in March 1975. Extras or principals from other terrorist organizations were involved in some of these as well. To what extent, if any, that state actors may also have taken a hand is unknown.
The commonalities, differences, or changes in patterns of behavior that have been described thus far are, of course, attributable to the interplay of a host of variables. Only a few of these, i.e., the ones that seem to have had the greatest direct bearing on the timing, scope, and nature of the *internationalization* of terror, are addressed at any length below. No attempt is made to develop some sort of model or overarching theory with respect to this phenomenon. Far more modest, the objective here is simply to ascertain to what extent the current rash of transnational (and, to a lesser degree, international) terrorist activity is attributable to broad regional and global trends and developments as opposed to unique and possibly transitory local problems and circumstances.

A few general observations—some of them, perhaps self-evident—are needed to set the problem in perspective and to lay the groundwork for further analysis. First of all, *transnational terrorism* is by nature more congenial to urban than to rural-based groups and is thus characteristically spawned by societies at a mid to advanced stage of socio-economic development. Resort to *international terrorism*, on the other hand, is just as likely to result from calculations concerning the relative efficacy of alternative methods for bringing national power to bear in a given situation as from an outright dearth of national resources. Hence, such behavior is not the special province of any particular category of state.

Modern-day practitioners of transnational terrorism have benefited from a generally permissive international environment—a point which will be elaborated below. For the most part, therefore, the *constraints* on their behavior have either been a function of local environmental factors affecting their objective capabilities, opportunities, and alternatives or have been self-imposed for tactical or philosophical reasons.

These latter restraints are, of course, uncertain, for personal predilections can be overshadowed by frustration or desperation. Nevertheless, as evidenced by the data presented in Appendices B and C, cultural *heritage* has been a key factor affecting individual terrorist groups' perceptions of the limits beyond which the level or intensity of violence is likely to become counterproductive. Moreover, although generalization is difficult because the ideological mix is different in almost every case, so has what is here termed the group's *credo* or *ethos*. The sharp differences in behavior between the two wings of the IRA and among the various Palestinian terrorist groups are evidence enough of this. But far more research is needed before confident judgments will be possible with respect to just what combinations of beliefs are most likely to foster repeated resort to extreme and indiscriminate forms of violence.

Since the extent and efficacy of internal security controls bear heavily on the frequency, form, and domestic impact of transnational terrorist incidents in any given country, *the proliferation of this form of political violence has both contributed to and fed upon the recent trend toward more widespread resort to various forms of authoritarian rule*. On one hand, open societies and weak or permissive authoritarian regimes are particularly vulnerable to such activity—and to its domestic ramifications. On the other, rigid and forceful authoritarian rule can foster transitional terrorism by forcing dissidents to operate abroad.

Together with earlier references to the basic societal problems that can give rise to various forms of political violence, the foregoing observations focus on the human and local environmental factors affecting the extent, nature, and domestic impact of transnational or international terrorist activity in different parts of the world. The question remains, however, as to just why there has been such a marked and enduring upsurge in transnational terrorism over the past eight years. In part, this phenomenon is attributable to a war-punctuated regional conflict affecting the interests of a large number of nations and attended by particularly deep-seated feelings of bitterness and frustration. But it would not have grown to its present dimensions were it not for the concurrent convergence and acceleration of a number of changes in the global environment that had been taking shape much earlier.

These trends are difficult to disaggregate. Technological advance, growing global interdependence, and the increasing urgency attached to forced draft modernization in many parts of the world are, for example, closely interrelated. But each bears brief comment.

The impact of *new technology* on terrorist capabilities with respect to weapons, mobility, and tactical communications has already been cited. As evidenced by the development of ever more sophisticated letter bombs, the occasional employment of missiles, and the staging of coordinated actions in widely separated locations, it has been significant. But whatever the nature of a
terrorist act or the means of its execution, it must be remembered that the role of the media is critical to the spreading and intensification of its psychological impact. Hence, among all the technological advances in recent years, the development of satellite communications, and in particular, their upgrading in 1968 to include a television capability have unquestionably been among the most important in making transnational activity seem attractive to terrorist groups.

The advent of satellite communications has also fed and underscored the thickening network of political, economic, and technological dependencies and obligations now commonly subsumed under the rubric of interdependence. Whether or not this term has been abused of late, the growth in both the numbers and importance of international, transnational, and (as a consequence of the centralizing imperatives of local modernization efforts) subnational linkages over the past decade has had at least a two-fold impact on the world-wide potential for terrorism. On the one hand, it has created a host of new, vulnerable, and potentially highly disruptive targets for terrorist attack (e.g., commercial and communications centers, transportation hubs, international power grids and pipelines, super tankers, and jumbo aircraft). On the other, it has generated a sort of identity crisis that has been reflected in a troublesome countervailing upsurge of nationalism and ethnicity.

For their part, the many other strains and dislocations associated with the process of modernizing change have swelled the ranks of the alienated in many parts of the world. They have also added millions of emigre workers to the international pool of political exiles and refugees which terrorists can exploit for cover, recruits, and various forms of operational support.

The upsurge in transnational terrorism has also been aided and abetted by a "revolutionary" turn in the overall political environment somewhat reminiscent of that experienced about 200 years ago. The postwar order has, in fact, come under challenge from all sides: from the developing nations of the Third World; from "maverick" Communist regimes; from dissatisfied second rank powers; and from a broad array of social forces fired, with differing degrees of responsibility, by a new sense of "social conscience."

By late 1967, the potential for a general escalation of political violence was clear. Viewed in this context, the Palestinians' dramatic entry into the air piracy business in 1968 becomes something of a logical if unexpected extension of a chain of developments that had included the emergence of the unruly New Left, a further proliferation of violence-prone splinter groups, and the first indications of the general post-Guevara shift in emphasis from rural to urban guerrilla warfare in Latin America.*

The characteristics and contours of this "revolutionary atmosphere" have undergone some change in the intervening years. The salience of some of the original contributory issues, e.g., Vietnam, has faded. But, as amply illustrated by the increasingly sympathetic treatment accorded to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and other international forums over the past 18 months, that of the new moral, political, and economic standards championed by the Third World has not.** On the contrary, now backed by the new political clout of the Arab oil states, these values appear to be gaining in force. In short, the established postwar international political system has been cast into something of a state of flux—with all that that implies with respect to its effective order-keeping capabilities.

Terrorists have benefited from this overall state of affairs in many ways. Among other things, it has:

—Accorded an aura of legitimacy to the acts of any terrorist group claiming leftist revolutionary or national liberation movement status;

—Frustrated efforts to develop more effective international countermeasures;

—Facilitated transnational contact and cooperation among terrorist groups;

—Fostered a significant increase in the number of national, transnational, and international organizations providing national liberation movements and other "progressive" dissident

*With Guevara's demise and subsequent decline in stature as a revolutionary theorist and tactician, the works of such leading advocates of terrorist violence as Fannon, Satre, and Marighella have assumed increasing importance as a major literary source of inspiration for ultra militants in many parts of the world.

**The PLO is a political umbrella organization embracing several Fedayeen commando groups. It was accorded recognition as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people (at the expense of Jordan) by the 1974 "Islamic nonaligned" and Rabat summit meetings. In November of that same year, it was granted observer status by the UNGA. All told, some 50 states have allowed the PLO to open offices in their capitals. In addition, five UN-affiliated international agencies (ILO, WHO, UPU, ITU, and UNESCO) have granted it observer status.
formations with various forms of direct and indirect support.

The attitudes and behavior of supportive states—ranging from those willing to provide little more than kind words and occasional safe haven to those that regularly furnish practicing or potential terrorists with funds, arms, training, documentation, and other operational support—have constituted another key global environmental factor affecting the scope and nature of transnational terrorist activity during the period under review. Variable might be a better term, however, for the extent of such assistance has fluctuated with changing appreciations of broader interests on the part of the state actors involved. For example, 1975 witnessed a distinct downward trend in such support.

In any event, if one excludes the simply indulgent or indifferent (including those liberal Western European states like France and Switzerland that, because of their strategic location and the extensive protection they accord to democratic rights and freedoms, have become involuntary hosts to all manner of foreign dissident groups) the list of nations in question dwindles to less than a score. Counting a few states that have recently retired—or partially retired—from the business, these “activists” include (but are not limited to) Libya, Cuba, the USSR, China, North Korea, Algeria, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, Tanzania, Congo, Zaire, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and, however reluctant it has been to engage in such activity, Lebanon.

In some of these states, most of the support rendered to foreign revolutionary or guerrilla formations has been directed toward influencing the course of developments in one or two neighboring states or territories. And for many, perhaps most, the actual promotion of terrorist violence has been no more than a largely unintended byproduct of their activities. Nevertheless, in one way or another, all of them have directly contributed to the recent upsurge of transnational terrorism.

Two or three bear special mention. Take Libya, for example. The oil-rich Qaddafi regime has for some years been the world’s most unabashed governmental proponent of revolutionary violence. And from the number of times that Libya has been linked to specific terrorist groups and incidents—including Carlos’ raid on the OPEC meeting in Vienna—it would appear that Colonel Qaddafi has also been one of the world’s least inhibited practitioners of international terrorism.

Tripoli’s focus has been on nationalist formations, whatever their ideological coloration or religious leanings. Thus, the recipients of its favors (in the form of various combinations of financial, logistical, and technical support) have been numerous and varied. In addition to some of the more militant Palestinian splinter groups, they have included the Irish Republican Army and a number of less widely known guerilla movements based in the Philippines, Ethiopia, Somalia, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, Chad, Morocco, Tunisia, Thailand, and Panama.

This list is not exhaustive. Moreover, it bodes well to grow since, despite Tripoli’s professions of reluctance to grant safe haven to the JRA terrorists who seized the American Consulate General in Kuala Lumpur in August 1975, there have as yet been no convincing indications that Colonel Qaddafi has undergone a change of heart.

Moscow’s posture has been more ambiguous. Basically, the Soviets have had serious misgivings about the utility of transnational terrorist activity. They have repeatedly warned that excessive violence can tarnish the reputation of those involved and have stressed their belief that such tactics are not only generally unproductive but can lead to unforeseen and possibly uncontrollable adverse consequences. At the same time, however, the Kremlin’s broader interests—including, importantly, those stemming from its continuing adversary relationship with Peking—have denied it the option of a straightforward hands-off policy. Thus, after a period of hesitancy, the Soviets began channelling funds, weapons, and other assistance to fedayeen groups through a number of intermediaries in 1969. All indications are that they continue to do so today.* Similarly, they have continued their long-standing program (the more innocuous aspects of which are publicly associated with Moscow’s Patrice Lumumba University) of bringing young revolutionaries from all parts of the Third World to the Soviet Union for training and indoctrination. And like Carlos, some of these individuals have subsequently cropped up on the transnational terrorist scene.

There is also a considerable body of circumstantial evidence linking Moscow to various terrorist formations in Western Europe. That some linkages

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*In their commentary on fedayeen activities, however, the Soviets have consistently been careful to distinguish between “permissible” attacks on “legitimate” targets inside Israel and “regrettable” incidents involving noncombatant third parties.
exist may, in fact, be taken for granted, for the broad considerations cited above give the Soviets ample reason for selectively attempting to monitor, penetrate, and gain some influence over such groups. But for obvious reasons, they have had to be very circumspect. They seem, for example, to have relied more heavily there than anywhere else on the cooperation of intermediaries who, if exposed, can be plausibly represented as having acted on their own initiative. In any event, the only hard evidence of Warsaw Pact member assistance to individuals associated with the Baader-Meinhof Gang points to Pankow and Prague. The arms destined for the non-Marxist Provisional Wing of the IRA that were seized at Schiphol Airport in Holland in late 1971 were of Czechoslovak origin and had been handled by a Czechoslovak firm. Even in the original “Carlos Affair,” Cuba was the state actor most directly implicated. In short, the true dimensions of Soviet involvement remain extremely difficult to ascertain.

Nonetheless, one thing is clear. However much the Soviets might wish otherwise, their efforts to gain some handle on extremist activity have, together with their pursuit of less congruent objectives, done more to aggravate than to contain the current rash of transnational terrorist activity. The hard fact is that it is difficult to translate assistance into leverage or control when there are other available sources of support. Indeed, as the Soviets should by now have learned, any assistance provided to an extremist group under these circumstances risks simply increasing the recipient’s potential for autonomous action.

A third actor deserving of separate comment is Cuba—not so much because of the extent of Havana’s past activities in support of revolution and rebellion, but because there is mounting evidence (such as the statement issued at the conclusion of the regional Communist conference which was hosted by the Cubans in June 1975) that Castro’s ambiguous policies have finally undergone a fundamental change in this regard. After years of hedging, the Cubans have now publicly espoused Moscow’s recommended via pacifica strategy with respect to revolutionary struggle in Latin America—a development which bodes ill for those smaller militant formations that still rely heavily on Cuban support. It would appear that they will have to fall in line or face the risk of extinction. But many of Latin America’s more active proponents of armed struggle are less vulnerable to Cuban retrenchment. Some are already highly self-sufficient. Of the remainder, those who are unable to tap the enormous war chests that have been accumulated by Argentine terrorist groups are likely to engage in more frequent ransom and resupply operations of their own. Partly because of this, and partly because Castro has made it abundantly clear that he does not intend to effect a parallel cutback in his support of armed revolutionary struggle outside of Latin America, the impact of Cuba’s new posture on the overall level of transnational terrorism may be minimal.

The last and most elusive global variable to be addressed here is the overall economic environment. It can impact on the problem of terrorism in a number of subtle and, in some cases, countervailing ways. For example, extra-cyclical world-wide economic strains—such as those generated by the sudden quadrupling of oil prices—can so overtax the capabilities of local regimes as to invite domestic violence of a sort that could easily spill over national boundaries. Short of this, they can contribute to a general undercurrent of unrest by curtailing the resources that can be devoted to ameliorating societal ills.

Because the social and political effects of cyclical trends in the overall economic climate tend to be delayed and uneven, the potential consequences of short-term fluctuations do not lend themselves to generalization. Medium- to long-term trends, however, can affect both the potential and the opportunities for transnational terrorist activity in any given area. In so far as it affects industrialized countries, rising economic prosperity can, for example, facilitate the undetected movement of terrorist groups by fostering a heavy flow of tourist and commercial travel. It also attracts the large aggregations of emigre workers that not only make it easier for foreign terrorists to escape notice but provide a ready pool of manpower for their operational teams and support mechanisms. More broadly, a prolonged and general economic upturn can increase local potentials for political violence by causing popular expectations to far outpace governmental capacities to deliver. And in more affluent societies, at least, the attendant emphasis on materialistic values can alienate significant segments of the student and intellectual communities. Indeed, a combination of these last two destabilizing trends contributed, together with the factors cited earlier, to the emergence of a distinctly “revolutionary” political atmosphere in the late 1960s.

Conversely, a prolonged economic decline (something which some observers predict the world will experience for the next 20 years or more) has
generally tended to dampen revolutionary ardor. Popular expectations decline, and people everywhere are preoccupied with the exigencies of day-to-day existence. But the world has much changed since its last broad economic slide. Whether the numbing effects of generalized adversity will be felt as strongly in the future is thus open to question. Their potential impact on the level of transnational terrorist activity is even more uncertain. The actors engaged therein are scarcely representative of the general population. They are few in number and elitist by nature. And given the proven strength of their convictions, they are likely to be among the most resistant to the psychological effects of untoward changes in the overall economic environment.

How Cost Effective?

The answer to this question depends on the vantage point of the observer. The achievement of disproportionately large effects from the employment of minimal resources is, of course, what political terrorism is all about. Its most serious drawback is that its consequences are, as the Soviets maintain, to a considerable degree unpredictable. It can alienate those groups whose sympathy was sought. Rather than disorient the masses, it can rally them to a previously unpopular government. It can galvanize a weak or wavering government into forceful counteraction. In short, tactical successes can, as in Jordan in 1970 and Uruguay in 1970-72, lead to strategic reverses of major proportions.

This risk is, however, easily accepted by those who dispose of no effective alternative methods for achieving their goals. Moreover, despite a number of sobering experiences, the overall balance sheet thus far provides the practitioners of transnational terrorism with grounds for considerable optimism.

Briefly put, the record shows that both transnational and international terrorists have generally been successful in avoiding capture (or, if caught, in escaping punishment) and in meeting at least some of their proximate objectives. For example, in a study of 63 major kidnapping and barricade operations executed between early 1968 and late 1974, the RAND Corporation concluded that such actions were subject to the following probabilities of risk and success:

- 87 percent probability of actually seizing hostages;
- 40 percent chance that all or some demands would be met in operations where something more than just safe passage or exit permission was demanded;
- 29 percent chance of full compliance with such demands;
- 83 percent chance of success where safe passage or exit, for the terrorists themselves or for others, was the sole demand;
- 67 percent chance that, if concessions to the principal demands were rejected, all or virtually all members of the terrorist team could still escape alive by going underground, accepting safe passage in lieu of their original demands, or surrendering to a sympathetic government; and
- virtually a 100 percent probability of gaining major publicity whenever that was one of the terrorists' goals.*

Such hostage operations have resulted in the freeing of large numbers of prisoners, the payment of huge ransoms, and in one case where Austria was targeted, the changing of government policy. Until mid-1974, at least, the record for skyjacking was fully comparable. Out of 127 terrorist attempts to seize aircraft between March 1968 and early July 1974, only a dozen were abortive. Of the remainder, less than 10 are known for certain to have ended in the death or imprisonment of the terrorists. In a great majority of cases through 1972, the skyjackers were successful in securing full compliance with their demands. Thereafter, however, they generally received no more than safe haven, and for the past year and a half, skyjacking has been a distinctly losing proposition. Of the 6 attempts made between late July 1974 and the end of 1975, 4 were nipped in the bud and the other 2 brought sentences of death or life in prison to the terrorists involved.

Terrorist acts lacking a bargaining dimension (e.g., bombings and assassinations) have generally entailed a correspondingly lower degree of risk. All told, only about 267 individuals associated with transnational terrorist activity have been caught in the past five years. Of these, 39 were freed without punishment, 58 escaped punishment by getting safe conduct to another country, 16 were released from confinement

One Barricade and Hostage Operation That Went Awry

On 24 April 1975, a group of West German terrorists identifying themselves as members of the Holger Meinz Commando seized the FRG Embassy in Stockholm in a bloody and abortive attempt to force Bonn to release 26 individuals associated with the Baader-Meinhof organization from jail. When their demands were refused, the terrorists dynamited the top story of the embassy building in an equally unsuccessful effort to cover their escape. The photo shows the embassy burning in the background as Swedish police carry off one of the captured terrorists.

on the demand of fellow terrorists, 50 were released after serving out their prison terms, and 104 were still in jails as of mid-September 1975. The average sentence meted out to those terrorists who have actually stood trial has been 18 months.*

How Disruptive?

The human and material toll exacted by transnational and international terrorist violence over the past eight years has been relatively low. For example, although the total cost of such activity in terms of ransom payments and property damage has never been tallied, all indications are that it falls far short of the half billion dollars loss suffered to school vandals in the US each year.

Closer track has been kept of the human casualties involved. Latest estimates place these at about 800 killed and 1,700 wounded—including the losses incurred by the terrorists themselves. To put these figures in better perspective, consider the fact that they fall somewhat short of the total casualties attributable to domestic terrorism in Northern Ireland alone during the same period or that Argentine terrorists and “counterterrorists” have managed to kill more than 1,000 of their compatriots since mid-1974. For a starker contrast, take Vietnam. There, in one year (1968), Viet Cong terrorists were credited with assassinating 6,000 people and wounding 16,000 more. Comparisons with “normal” levels of domestic violence in the US may also be useful. There were, for example, about 20,000 homicides—and more than 2,000 bombings—recorded here in 1975.

The juxtaposition of these statistics suggests that the dimensions of the problem posed by transnational and international terrorism are still quite small and that the increase in such activity since 1968, while marked, should have done little to undermine world order. But the disruptive impact of these terrorist incidents and campaigns has been magnified by the publicity they have received and by their interaction with other destabilizing trends and forces. Thus, while the terrorists have made no revolutions and, by

*“Terrorism: ‘Growing and Increasingly Dangerous’.‘ (Interview with Robert A. Fearey, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Combating Terrorism), U.S. News and World Report, 29 September 1975, p. 79.
DATELINE:

HIGHLIGHTS OF A YEAR-END AND INTERNATIONAL

2 DECEMBER: South Molluccan Terrorists Seize a Dutch Train

South Molluccan terrorists pick up supplies outside the train that they held for 12 days before surrendering to Dutch authorities.

4 DECEMBER: South Molluccan Terrorists Seize the Indonesian Consulate in Amsterdam

A blindfolded and tethered hostage is displayed on a third floor balcony of the Indonesian Consulate on 5 December—a full two weeks before his South Molluccan captors finally laid down their arms and surrendered.
DECEMBER 1975

UPSURGE IN MAJOR TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS

• 21 DECEMBER: The Carlos-Led "Arm of the Arab Revolution" Attacks the OPEC Ministers' Meeting in Vienna

Wounded in the assault on OPEC's Vienna headquarters, a terrorist is carried off to the hospital. The following day, he was placed on board the plane that carried the rest of his group and 43 of their hostages to North Africa.

• 21 DECEMBER: An American Employee of a US Firm is Kidnapped in Ethiopia by Eritrean Terrorists

• 23 DECEMBER: A US Embassy Official is Gunned Down by Unidentified Terrorists in Athens

22 Days of Terror: The overlapping periods of direct terrorist violence associated with the five incidents cited here spanned almost the whole month of December.
themselves at least, toppled no governments, they have:

— Embarrassed several governments and contributed to the effective collapse of a few (e.g., the initial Bordaberry Administration in Uruguay and the Isabel Peron regime in Argentina);

— Added an abrasive new dimension to both North-South and East-West relations;

— Contributed to the growing international status and fortunes of the PLO;

— Compelled some nations to temporarily abandon their law enforcement function (e.g., to release captured terrorists) out of fear of future retribution;

— Aggravated and accentuated the dilemmas generated within the existing international system by the emergence of a growing company of powerful non-state actors;

— Introduced strains in relations among those Western nations which, because of divergent national interests, feel constrained to adopt differing positions with respect to specific incidents or broader terrorist-related issues;

— Reinforced the currently pervasive sense of global flux and disorder;

— Caused a large number of nations, including the US, to divert substantial resources to defense against terrorist attacks,*

— Adversely affected the quality of life in many open or formerly open societies.

In short, while scarcely cataclysmic, the spoiling effects of modern-day transnational and international terrorism have been substantial. Harking back to earlier discussion, this state of affairs is both a measure and, in large part, a consequence of increasing global interdependence. As the dimensions and complexity of the web of interstate and transnational linkages that together comprise the functional core of the "international system" have grown under the impact of technological advance, the reverberations of events—including terrorist attacks—which disturb or threaten its more important intersections have tended to become increasingly widespread and sharply felt. At the same time, the limits within which individual states can attempt to cope with such problems through unilateral action without risk of adversely affecting the interests of others have steadily narrowed. But, as previously observed, rather than encourage increasing interest in supranational solutions, the frustrations born of this de facto shrinkage of sovereignty have generated an unhelpful backlash of nationalism. And this, of course, has been one of the key factors that have affected the nature and effectiveness of the international community's response to the terrorist threat.

What International Constraints?

With the exception of a number of bilateral agreements providing, inter alia, for a greater exchange of intelligence and technical assistance or, as in the memorandum of understanding concerning hijackers of aircraft and vessels that was signed by the US and Cuba in 1973, for the prompt extradition of specified categories of terrorists, the international response to terrorism has been relatively weak and ineffective.

The UN's problems in grappling with transnational terrorism were cited and illustrated at the outset of this study. International terrorism, however, has proved to be a somewhat less contentious issue. Indeed, the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States which the General Assembly adopted without vote on 24 October 1970 asserts at one point that:

Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission

*In the US, this has been reflected most clearly in the installation of an effective but costly airport security system and, following the Khartoum incident of 1973, in a supplemental $20 million appropriation provided to the Department of State for the sole purpose of improving the security of American diplomatic and consular installations abroad. The construction of a special bomb-proof courthouse in which to try the captured leaders of the Baader-Meinhof Gang was one of the more notable extra expenses that have been incurred by Bonn. By the time these proceedings are over, it is estimated that they will have cost the West German taxpayer more than $6 million. Even the liberal Swedes have become nervous since incurring the wrath of the JRA in March 1975 by arresting two members of that group and deporting them to Japan. In any event, they chose to take no chances when they hosted the Chilean Davis Cup tennis team some six months later. They converted the fashionable coastal resort where the matches were held into a veritable fortress protected by floodlights; fences up to 35 feet high; and a 1,300-man police force equipped with gunboats, helicopters, scores of dogs, and some 50 horses.
of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force."

But even as an essentially unenforceable admonition, this rule of behavior is weakened and clouded by the greater emphasis that the Declaration accords to the "principal of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." The language employed in this regard implies that it is the overriding duty of all states to assist groups struggling for the realization of these rights in every way possible. For example, the Declaration avers that:

Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives people referred to above in the elaboration of the present principles of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. [Emphasis added]"

There have, in addition, been a total of five international conventions adopted over the past 12 years that have dealt with one or another aspect (in all cases rather narrow) of the terrorism problem. These are as follows:

—The Tokyo Convention (Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft): Signed in September 1963, it did not come into force until December 1969. It is a very limited accord which does no more than to set a few jurisdictional ground rules and to require the contracting states to (1) make every effort to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful commander and (2) arrange for the prompt onward passage or return of hijacked aircraft together with their passengers, cargo, and crew. As of this writing, 77 countries have ratified it.

—The Hague Convention (Convention for the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft): Signed in December 1970, it came into force 10 months later. Its principal feature is that it requires (albeit with important discretionary exceptions) contracting parties either to extradite or to prosecute skyjackers. Seventy-four countries have ratified it.

—The Montreal Convention (Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety


**Ibid., p. 791.

Although they reflect international concern and at least a slim majority consensus that something must be done, these conventions presently do not, singly or in combination, constitute much of an effective constraint on terrorist activity. In the first place, many states—including a high percentage of those that have been particularly active in supporting revolutionary or national liberation groups—are not yet parties thereto. Secondly, the conventions lack teeth in that all make the extradition or prosecution of terrorists subject to discretionary escape clauses and none provides for the application of punitive sanctions against states that simply refuse to comply at all. Finally, the exclusive focus on skyjacking and the
protection of diplomats leaves a good deal of terrorist activity outside the cognizance of international law.

But this, it would seem, is all the traffic will bear. The US has tried repeatedly to correct some of these deficiencies and has run into a stonewall of opposition on each occasion. For example, at the conclave sponsored by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) that formulated the final draft of The Hague Convention, the US delegation sought unsuccessfully to (1) limit drastically exceptions to extradition of hijackers, (2) establish hijacking as a common crime, and (3) exclude political motivation as a defense against extradition or prosecution of hijackers. Two years later, in September 1972, the US submitted a draft convention to the UNGA that was aimed at limiting the “export” of terrorism. But even though it established a number of restrictive criteria that would have to be met before its enforcement provisions became applicable, it was effectively stifled by opposition centering on the impermissibility of interference with the right of self-determination. The following summer, a proposal sponsored by the US and several other nations for a separate enforcement convention that would have backed the Tokyo, Hague, and Montreal documents with sanctions affecting the rights and services guaranteed under existing international and bilateral air service agreements was soundly defeated at the ICAO’s Rome Conference and Assembly.

The obstacles which have blocked more effective international action are formidable. They have, as previously indicated, included the controversy over justifiable versus illegal political violence and broad resistance to such further infringements of national sovereignty as would be implied in any inflexible curtailment of the right to grant political asylum. Equally important, however, they have also included an understandable reluctance on the part of many nations otherwise ill-disposed toward terrorist activity to commit themselves to any course of action that might either invite direct terrorist retribution or provoke the application of sanctions by states that happen to be sympathetic to the terrorists’ cause.

To make these observations is not, however, to imply immutability. It must be remembered, for example, that such progress as has been made in the field of multilateral countermeasures has, in each instance, been occasioned by reaction to some general or specific escalation of terrorist violence. (In this regard, hopes that Carlos’ assault on the OPEC ministerial meeting in Vienna will have some sort of salutary catalytic effect may yet be borne out in practice.) There are, moreover, a host of other factors which could alter the attitudes and behavior of any of the state actors concerned. Hence, whether or not all the obstacles to a more effective international response that have been cited thus far will retain their present force in the decade ahead is a valid question—and it is one that is addressed below.

IV. THE OUTLOOK

International Terrorism

Although it is possible that a few others may emulate the irresponsible behavior of Libya’s Colonel Qaddafi, international terrorism seems unlikely to pose much of a threat to world order or US interests during the next few years. Even in its presently weakened state, the international system subjects states to a host of legal obligations and practical constraints that they can ignore only at considerable risk. The continuing force of these considerations is evidenced by the fact that international terrorism is no more prevalent today than it was in 1968.

Indeed, throughout the entire postwar era, both the weak and the musclebound have tended to view international terrorism as a policy tool to be used sparingly and (except when exercising their “right” of retaliation) discreetly when potentially effective alternative means are lacking. Moreover, while no apologia for such activity is intended, it should be noted that—with the exception of certain actions undertaken in connection with the Middle East conflict—its objectives have generally been defensive (e.g., the neutralization of hostile foreign-based groups or individuals) as opposed to the offensive and deliberately disruptive character of most transnational terrorism.

Nevertheless, the sporadic employment of government-controlled terrorist groups against Israeli targets both within and outside that country’s borders raises some troublesome questions about what the 1980s may hold in store. And while their true sponsorship has yet to be firmly established, so do the recent Rejectionist Front-associated operations in Madrid and Vienna that were intended to bring pressure on moderate Arab regimes.

These questions center on the kind of adjustments in international behavior that may flow from ongoing changes in the distribution and component elements of national power and, no less important, from the growing array of economic, political, and technological restraints affecting the ways in which
latent power can be translated into effective leverage. Are Arab actions a precursor of things to come? Is it, in fact, likely that, lacking or despairing of more conventional means for defending or advancing their international interests, an increasing number of states will opt to engage in—or to sponsor—terrorist activity?

In assessing this possibility, some observers have noted that because of the expense, the risks, and the constraints deriving from the patron-client relationships that are now involved, high-intensity conventional warfare—even of the local variety—may be becoming obsolete. On the other hand, although it is "permissible" under current international ground rules, low-level protracted conflict of the Vietnam type is not, as they point out, a very attractive alternative. For these reasons, they suggest that there will be a strong temptation for governments to employ terrorist groups as means of waging "surrogate warfare" against other nations. Brian Jenkins has expressed this notion as follows:

"Terrorists, whatever their origin or cause, have demonstrated the possibilities of a third alternative—that of "surrogate warfare." Terrorism, though now rejected as a legitimate mode of warfare by most conventional military establishments, could become an accepted form of warfare in the future. Terrorists could be employed to provoke international incidents, create alarm in an adversary's country, compel it to divert valuable resources to protect itself, destroy its morale, and carry out specific acts of sabotage. Governments could employ existing terrorist groups to attack their opponents, or they could create their own terrorists. Terrorism requires only a small investment, certainly far less than what it cost to wage conventional war. It can be debilitating to the enemy. Prior to the 1973 Yom Kippur War, a senior Israeli officer estimated that the total cost in men and money to Israel for all defensive and offensive measures against at most a few thousand Arab terrorists was 40 times that of the Six Days War in 1967. A secret backer of the terrorists can also deny sponsoring them. The concepts of subversion, sabotage, and lightning raids carried out by commandos, are not new, but the opportunities are."*

The case presented, however, is far stronger with respect to the probability of increasing resort to some form of surrogate warfare—which, as Brian Jenkins notes, is scarcely a new phenomenon—than for the corollary argument that this development is likely to be characterized by widespread adoption of terrorist tactics.** For one thing, the safety factor of deniability would all but disappear if a state were to engage in such activity on a regular basis. For another, barring total collapse of world order and consequent international anarchy (something that no state actor has reason to promote), international terrorism is highly unlikely to gain acceptance as an admissible form of behavior in the foreseeable future.

All told, in fact, it seems likely that the employment of terrorist groups in a surrogate warfare role will continue to be more the exception than the rule for some time to come. And if this proves to be the case, it follows that while there may be a slight upward trend in the annual total of international terrorist incidents, the scope of the problem in 1985 should not be much more serious than it is today.

**Transnational Terrorism**

On balance, the outlook with respect to transnational terrorism is less encouraging. On the positive side, the decline in the number of states willing to provide terrorist safe haven gives promise of being lasting.* It seems most doubtful that the currently shrinking aggregations of emigre workers will soon regain their former size, and this will probably have some small impact on the security and resources of terrorist groups operating in Western Europe. More importantly, political developments of a sort which presently seem to be at least possible could significantly reduce levels of terrorist activity in such current trouble spots as Northern Ireland, Argentina, and the Middle East.

But overall, the potential for domestic, international, and transnational terrorism is—as asserted at the outset of this study—almost certain to remain high. Furthermore, most of the broad environmental factors that have contributed to the feasibility, efficacy, and popularity of transnational terrorism in recent years will continue to operate with at least equal force in the decade ahead. The salience of some, in fact, seems bound to increase.

Barring some cataclysmic event which reduces mankind to a more primitive order of existence, technological advance, modernizing social and economic change, and growing global interdependence are, for example, essentially irreversible phenomena

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*Although this trend has been evident for some time, it was underscored in August 1975 when the JRA terrorists who had seized the US Consulate in Kuala Lumpur not only had great difficulty in finding a state willing to grant them safe haven, but were even denied permission to transit nationally-controlled airspace by some Third World countries.

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**It must be remembered that under the definitions employed in this study, there are many kinds of covert subversive activity—including support of insurgent paramilitary forces and even sponsorship of highly discriminate sabotage operations—that would not of themselves constitute terrorism.
with an urgency and momentum which seems more likely to increase than to decline in the coming decade. And while their political consequences can, to a certain degree, be controlled by carefully-tailored policy decisions, they bode well to aggravate the terrorism problem by generating further increases in (1) divisive ethnicity and nationalism, (2) urban unrest, (3) terrorist capabilities, and (4) societal vulnerabilities.

In the political field, the widespread erosion of established institutions of authority that has both invited and facilitated terrorist activity in recent years shows no signs of abatement. For its part, the postwar international order seems likely to remain under challenge—and thus in flux—throughout the decade ahead. But the problem will probably continue to be most evident at the national level where increasing difficulties of governance hold forth the prospect of a further proliferation of ineffective and unstable regimes.

As a byproduct of the above, most non-state actors on the world stage will probably manage to escape significantly firmer national or international control for some time to come. Because of this, and because the values underlying the strong "social conscience" component of today's political environment seem likely to retain their current force, the chances are that national liberation and leftist revolutionary formations will continue to receive both moral and material support from a wide variety of transnational and international organizations as well as a potentially substantial flow of ransom and "insurance" payments from vulnerable multinational corporations.

At the same time, the trend toward greater international contact and cooperation among terrorist groups that has already markedly enhanced the operational capabilities of some of the organizations involved seems likely to gain further momentum. For one thing, lingering inhibitions born of sharply different goals and outlook are bound to decline in the face of continuing and widely-publicized proof of the advantages that can be derived from such a course. For another, the tough but scattered local counter-terrorist campaigns that are sure to dot the political landscape throughout the decade ahead will each provide compelling new incentives for transnational cooperation.

Ominously enough, therefore, the wave of the future seems to be toward the development of a complex support base for transnational terrorist activity that is largely independent of—and quiet resistant to control by—the state-centered international system. This does not mean, however, that the behavior of supportive state actors will become increasingly irrelevant. On the contrary, it suggests that unless the principal patrons of subversion and revolutionary violence cut back on the assistance they are furnishing to practicing or potential terrorists more drastically than currently available evidence as to their intentions gives grounds to expect, the deleterious impact of their behavior may be considerably greater than in the past.

The problem of extensive and sometimes sympathetic publicity is another aggravating environmental factor that promises to persist in many parts of the world. Not only has all the attention that has been focused on terrorism made it increasingly newsworthy, but the coverage and capabilities of the world's satellite communications systems have been steadily upgraded since 1968. Moreover, radio, television, and the press are bound to continue to reach an ever larger audience.

Although most Western media officials, at least, are by now fully aware of the danger of playing into terrorist hands, competitive pressures are strong and the line between responsible and irresponsible reportage or commentary is very fine. In short, self-censorship is unlikely to work very well. On the other hand, the only potentially more effective alternative—firm governmental management of the news—is, in time of peace, virtually out of the question in most Western democracies.

Another aspect of the information explosion that promises to continue to be troublesome is the diffusion of terrorist-adaptable technological know-how and—to a lesser degree—of possibly inspirational speculation about new and potentially ultra-disruptive terrorist tactics. Although the objectives of such literature may be (and most often are) above reproach, it can scarcely help but aggravate the problems posed by the development and wholesale deployment of sophisticated (and in many cases, man-portable) weaponry: the world-wide proliferation of nuclear facilities; and the race, motivated by both political and economic considerations, to sell nuclear technology and modern armaments to developing countries. And these problems are serious enough as it is. Indeed, despite the attention that has been paid to nuclear safeguards and the physical security of sensitive installations and depots, the world seems to be moving toward a state of affairs in which the limits of any "technological escalation" of terrorist violence will depend more on the self-imposed restraints
affecting the behavior of the groups involved than on lack of capability or opportunity.

It is, of course, the upper limits of the potential scale of terrorist violence that are of most concern. Individual terrorist groups already have the capability of manufacturing or otherwise acquiring a variety of weapons or agents of mass destruction. More will be in a position to exercise this option in the future. Just how likely is it that they will do so?

That the threatened employment of such awesome ordnance would have profound political and psychological effects is undeniable. But it must be emphasized that there are major hazards that would be involved for the terrorists as well. The most important of these (and the one probably primarily responsible for the failure of terrorists to make more of an effort to exploit mass destruction technology in the past) is the high risk of adverse public reaction—particularly in the event that the group involved were to end up in a position where it felt compelled to make good its threat.

Although a few terrorist groups have, in fact, resorted to indiscriminate mass murder, such instances have been relatively rare, and in each case thus far the human toll has been negligible in comparison to the casualties that would result from the broadcast of only a few ounces or less of a highly toxic agent or the detonation of even a small nuclear device. Basically, terrorists are in business to influence people, not exterminate them. Moreover, those that aspire to some sort of political legitimacy—and this means most of them—are generally quite sensitive to the need to take some care to avoid alienating local and international opinion.

The fact remains, however, that weapons of mass destruction cannot help but hold considerable temptation for militants whose basic strategy of violence centers on wringing maximum political leverage from publicity and fear. Hence, it seems prudent to assume that sooner or later some group is bound to take the plunge.

Because their very mention strikes terror into the hearts of many, nuclear weapons come first to mind. But the practical problems facing the would-be nuclear blackmailer are numerous and complex. Although nuclear devices are clearly no longer beyond terrorist reach, their acquisition (whether through theft or manufacture) is still—and for a few years yet will probably continue to be—a relatively demanding task. Once in terrorist hands, their emissions present anti-detection shielding problems not only during passive storage but, if deployed against specific targets, during the delivery and bargaining phases of the operation as well. Moreover, there is further room for trouble when it comes to establishing the credibility of the threat since the target authorities must be persuaded not only that the terrorists actually have a nuclear device but that it will probably work. Finally, all but the most fanatical terrorists might be given pause by the fact that if worst comes to worst, the destructive effects of such weapons are not manageable.

Thus, while the prospect of nuclear-armed terrorists can scarcely be dismissed, a more likely scenario—at least in the short term—would seem to be a terrorist seizure of a nuclear weapons storage facility or a nuclear power plant in a straightforward barricade operation. Such a group need not threaten a nuclear holocaust (although that possibility would be in the back of everyone's mind), just the destruction of the bunker or reactor with the attendant danger of radiological pollution. The threat would be inherently credible. The publicity would be enormous. And if their demands were to be denied, the terrorists would be in a position to tailor the amount of damage they actually inflicted to their appreciation of the existing circumstances.

A more pressing threat, however, would seem to lie in the field of chemical, biological, and radiological agents. In contrast to nuclear devices, many of these are presently relatively easy to acquire. Hence the danger that they could turn up in the hands of the sort of ultra-radical or psychopathic fringe group that would have the fewest compunctions about actually using them is very real. Moreover, since small—sometimes minute—quantities are usually all that are needed for potentially devastating effects, such agents also tend to be easy to conceal, easy to transport, and easy to introduce into the target area. Credibility poses few problems, for a small sample of the agent delivered by mail or left at some designated pick-up point should quickly dispel any doubts on this score. Finally, a number of these agents offer the additional advantage of being amenable to relatively selective targeting (e.g., the occupants of a single building or compound).

As implied in earlier discussion, any such dramatic escalation of terrorist violence as that suggested by these brief scenarios on weapons of mass destruction would be likely to touch off a new flurry of efforts to devise international countermeasures. Indeed, another convention or two would probably result. But just how
much practical effect this would have is open to serious question.

Simply put, the net thrust of the forces at work within the international community promises to remain more centrifugal than centripetal throughout the decade ahead. Indeed, all indications are that rising nationalism and ethnicity, the developing nations' fundamental challenge to the existing world order, and the related proliferation of subnational and other non-state actors will continue to render the international system increasingly complex and uncertain. Moreover, the attendant diffusion and erosion of political authority will tend to be self-reinforcing. And under these circumstances, the degree of consensus needed to adopt and enforce meaningful counterterrorist accords will be more elusive than ever.

It follows that the recent stiffening of a number of nations' policies toward terrorists is almost certainly more reflective of relatively narrow and quite disparate tactical calculations—with respect, for example, to such things as improved domestic security arrangements, the current state of play in the Arab-Israeli conflict, or the latitude of action that may now be afforded by Third World divisions and the general unpopularity of certain terrorist groups—than of any broad upsurge of interest in a global approach. Nonetheless, this development is encouraging for it opens up new possibilities for bilateral and limited multilateral counterterrorist undertakings of a sort that have, in combination with unilateral measures, proved relatively effective in the past.

In sum, although it is unlikely to trigger a collapse of world order, transnational terrorism promises to pose a continuing and potentially gravely unsettling problem for the world community until such time—possibly years hence—that the international system gels into new and generally accepted contours. The frequency and intensity of violence will decline in some areas. The cast of characters will be constantly changing. In all likelihood, technological and organizational innovations in the security field will make terrorism a more risky affair. Yet at best the overall number of terrorist groups seems unlikely to decline—and the number of countries in which they are active appears destined to grow. Furthermore, because of their symbolic value, their availability, and the embarrassment they can create, the popularity of American targets will probably remain high.

Ironically, there may well be fewer people engaged in transnational terrorist activity some five years hence than there are today. But this prospect is not as encouraging as it sounds. For even if changes in the political environment or partial satisfaction of their objectives do encourage some of the larger and more "responsible" formations to eschew transnational violence, their place on the international stage is likely to be quickly filled by more militant splinter groups—not to mention a smattering of total newcomers to the game. And since (as amply demonstrated by the JRA, Carlos and company, and the PFLP) small terrorist groups can, when properly connected, mount all manner of highly disruptive operations, such a development could—through the introduction of additional increments of fanaticism—prove at least temporary increases in the intensity of terrorist violence.

In any event, it seems likely that the constraints on terrorist behavior will, through international default, continue to depend primarily on (1) the terrorists' subjective orientation and (2) the policies and resources of the individual countries in which they operate. Of necessity, however, the impact of these will be uneven. Remember, too, that the inherent dynamics and logic of a campaign of terrorist violence are such that it has a natural propensity to escalate over time. Moreover, all but the most isolated terrorist groups will be able to draw on a common and cumulative media-fed pool of experience and inspiration. Hence, even if the cited constraints do result in some tapering off in the frequency of transnational terrorist incidents during the next few years, we should expect to witness steadily greater and more widespread sophistication in targetting, execution, and weaponry. And while, as suggested earlier, most groups will probably continue to be deterred by both moral considerations and calculations of the risks involved, the danger that a fanatic few might resort to weapons of mass destruction will increase accordingly.

V. IMPLICATIONS

Two basic messages emerge from the foregoing discussion. The first is that the phenomenon of widespread internationalized terror is not only likely to persist for at least the next several years, but also to evolve in ways that could pose a more substantial threat to US interests—and, under certain circumstances, to world order—than in the recent
past.* The second is that the factors bearing on this phenomenon and its political ramifications are so numerous and cut across so many jurisdictional and disciplinary lines that the development of more effective national and international countermeasures is likely to be a particularly demanding task.

Whether or not weapons of mass destruction are actually brought into play, the odds are that the impact of transnational and international terror will be more sharply felt in the US in the years just ahead. There is, for example, good reason to believe that at least a few foreign terrorist groups are planning to step up their attacks on American targets abroad in the near future. Moreover, the influx of foreign travellers and dignitaries expected in connection with such major US-sponsored events as the current Bicentennial celebrations and the 1980 Winter Olympics will inescapably afford a host of opportunities for dramatic terrorist action. Hence, despite the likelihood that the practical considerations there is a good chance that a operation to US shores will retain their present force, somewhat more frequently in the future-partly to that have so far generally deterred foreign-based Washington will be targeted terrorist groups from extending their areas of opportunities for dramatic terrorist action. Hence, step up their attacks on American targets abroad in probes.

Olympics will inescapably afford a host of temptation to do so.** Finally, no matter how tough such major US-sponsored events as the current Bicentennial celebrations and the 1980 Winter Olympics will inescapably afford a host of opportunities for dramatic terrorist action. Hence, despite the likelihood that the practical considerations that have so far generally deterred foreign-based terrorist groups from extending their areas of operation to US shores will retain their present force, there is a good chance that a few will succumb to the temptation to do so.** Finally, no matter how tough and well-publicized a “no concessions” policy the US Government maintains, it seems likely that Washington will be targeted by terrorist demands somewhat more frequently in the future—partly to probe more fully the limits of US resolve, partly for sheer publicity or other psychological effect, and partly to foster intergovernmental or domestic tensions.

More importantly, perhaps, even if the problem of internationalized terror is not brought “closer to home” in the ways suggested above, it promises to impinge more directly on US interests and options

*Despite the frequency with which terrorists have attacked American citizens and property overseas, the US has been lucky in many ways. For example, foreign terrorist groups have for the most part eschewed staging operations on American soil—and those transnational terrorist incidents that have been authored here by domestic groups have generally been relatively minor affairs. Furthermore, the US Government has, as previously indicated, largely been the target of terrorist demands. Hence, except for extensive (and readily accepted) airport security measures, the utility of American life and democratic freedoms has been little affected. And Washington has so far been spared the agony of avenging the lives of key political leaders or large numbers of innocents, be they Americans or foreigners, hang on its decisions.

**While it bears note, the parallel danger that commonly received opportunities for action in connection with such events would result in growing contact and cooperation between US-based and foreign terrorist groups falls outside the purview of this study.

with respect to a broad range of critical issue areas. For example, it is likely to:

—Figure as even more of an irritant in both East-West and North-South relations;
—Sharpen the dilemmas inherent in the politically and economically sensitive questions of arms sales and the transfer of advanced technology;
—Provide potential new grounds for strains in Washington's relations with its principal friends and allies;
—Reinforce some of the obstacles which currently impede efforts to find a mutually-acceptable way to cope with the dependence of Western industrialized countries on foreign energy sources; and
—Impose burdensome new demands on limited human and material resources.

Although, as emphasized in earlier discussion, the dimensions of the threat posed by international and transnational terror should not be overdrawn, the picture outlined above is sobering. Among other things, it suggests that the machinery and guidelines that the US and its allies have so far developed for dealing with the problem bear careful review.

There is no magic formula for endowing any given government's approach to the problem of terrorism with the direction, breadth, and coherence required to marshal the remarkably disparate talents and resources that are needed and to weave its response into the overall fabric of its domestic and foreign concerns. Indeed, any number of alternative courses of action could prove equally effective. Nevertheless, it bears emphasis that together with timely intelligence and sound multi-disciplinary analytical support, flexibility and extensive coordination (both inter- and intra-state) would seem to be critical to devising and implementing a counterterrorist strategy that is both internally consistent and minimally disruptive to national values and foreign policy objectives in terms of “hidden” social, economic, and political costs.

Obviously, such a strategy cannot be framed in isolation. Among other things, its architects would need ready access to top policymakers in both the foreign and domestic fields as well as to the advice of a broad range of government and non-government experts or interested parties. Moreover, the necessity to maintain some freedom of maneuver (born of the fact that every new terrorist incident is likely to have its unique aspects) is a particularly delicate
problem—and one that can easily contribute to unnecessary misunderstandings. Hence, routine pre-crisis coordination of terrorism-related policies and contingency plans with all the key domestic foreign actors whose interests and options they affect becomes all the more important.
APPENDIX A

INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM:
SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES

Group Characteristics
— Name of the organization or, if none, of the political, military, or bureaucratic entity controlling the actors
— Country of origin
— Relationship to the government of that country
— Size and organization
— Leadership
— Composition (the occupational and educational qualifications of the members and their age range)
— Credo/Ethos

Elementary Typology*

Particularistic (ethnic, religious, linguistic, or regional)
Nationalistic (irredentist or anti-colonial)
Ideological
Anarchism
Radical Left (revolutionary socialists, Trotskyites, Maoists, Guevarists, Castroites, and other ultra-left fringe groups)
Orthodox Communism
Extreme Right
Other
Pathological

— Domestic base (extent of popular sympathy and support, links with legitimate social or political organizations, and links with other domestic dissident groups)
— Foreign links (with other terrorist organizations, with international or legitimate transnational organizations, and with foreign governments)
— Life cycle (date of formation, period or periods of transnational or international activity, and, if applicable, date of demise)

Event Characteristics
— Location of incident
— Nature of act

Elementary Typology

Kidnapping
Barricade and hostage
Bombing (any type of explosive charge or device, including letter and parcel bombs)

*Major categories are not mutually exclusive.
Armed assault or ambush (with or without sophisticated weapons)
Hijacking (aircraft, ship, or other means of transportation)
Incendiary attack or arson
Assassination or murder
Chemical, bacteriological, or radiological pollution
Other

—Number, status, and nationalities of human victims
—Nature and national association of physical target
—Number, nationality, and organizational affiliation of the perpetrators
—Nature of demands (publicity, prisoner release, ransom, political action or change, arms, or safe passage)
—Targets of demands (governments, corporations, or international organizations)
—Outcome (duration of incident, identity and posture of governmental and transnational actors participating in its resolution, extent to which terrorists' demands were satisfied, fate of human victims, fate of terrorists, extent of property damage, and, if applicable, identity of nations granting or facilitating safe haven)

Local Environmental Characteristics
—Type, repressiveness, and effectiveness of government (representative democracy, authoritarian, or totalitarian)
—Societal traditions and attitudes with respect to authority and violence
—Homogeneity of the population
—Current levels of popular malaise and internal strife
—Current level of socio-economic development (including per capita GNP; levels of industrialization, urbanization, and literacy; and the proportion of the population possessed of higher education)
—Recent and current socio-economic growth rates (as above)
—Societal inequities (markedly unequal distribution of income, discriminatory practices, and systemic limits on social and political mobility)

Global Environmental Characteristics
—Technological Advance
   —Sophisticated man-portable weaponry (development, deployment, and international trade in such weapons)
   —Proliferation of nuclear facilities
   —Communications advances (developments affecting both media coverage and tactical communications)
   —Mobility-related developments
—Interdependence
   —New vulnerabilities (those links binding our increasingly interdependent world—e.g., commercial and communications centers, transportation hubs, international power grids and pipelines, super tankers, and jumbo
aircraft—that presently, or that may in the future, offer feasible and potentially highly disruptive targets for terrorist attack

—Reactive upsurge of nationalism and ethnicity

—Modernizing Social and Economic Change

—Destabilizing local effects
—Large emigre worker concentrations

—Political Environment

—The “revolutionary” atmosphere highlighted by the challenge to the existing world order raised by the “have not” nations
—The controversy over illegal versus justifiable political violence
—Shifts in priorities and values and the emergence of a strong sense of “social conscience”

—The dispersion and erosion of political authority

—The proliferation of non-state actors and the parallel increase in the number of international and transnational organizations providing moral or material support to national liberation or leftist revolutionary formations

—International agreements, treaties, and conventions relating to terrorist acts

—The behavior of states providing direct and indirect support to terrorist groups

—Transnational contact and cooperation among terrorist groups

—Significant international economic trends and developments

—Extra-cyclical events

—Cyclical fluctuations
APPENDIX B

STATISTICAL TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY
International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents by Category, 1968-75
Total: 913

Kidnapping
Total: 123

Barricade and Hostage
Total: 31

Assault or Ambush
Total: 95

Incendiary Attack or Arson
Total: 48

Other
Total: 45

Incl. 2 non-air hijackings.
# Geographic Distribution of Terrorism

## North America
- Total: 111
  - Kidnapping: 3
  - Barricade and Hostage: 1
  - Bombing: 7
  - Armed Assault or Ambush: 21
  - Hijacking (Air and Non-Air): 3
  - Assassination: 6
  - Incendiary Attack or Arson: 1

## Western and NATO Europe
- Total: 327
  - Kidnapping: 13
  - Barricade and Hostage: 14
  - Bombing: 30
  - Armed Assault or Ambush: 19
  - Hijacking (Air and Non-Air): 20
  - Assassination: 33
  - Incendiary Attack or Arson: 19

## Middle East and North Africa
- Total: 119
  - Kidnapping: 8
  - Barricade and Hostage: 7
  - Bombing: 25
  - Armed Assault or Ambush: 19
  - Hijacking (Air and Non-Air): 7
  - Assassination: 10

## Sub-Saharan Africa
- Total: 37
  - Kidnapping: 15
  - Barricade and Hostage: 2
  - Bombing: 6
  - Armed Assault or Ambush: 6
  - Hijacking (Air and Non-Air): 1
  - Assassination: 2

## Asia
- Total: 43
  - Kidnapping: 6
  - Barricade and Hostage: 2
  - Bombing: 6
  - Armed Assault or Ambush: 7
  - Hijacking (Air and Non-Air): 13
  - Assassination: 4
  - Incendiary Attack or Arson: 5

## Latin America
- Total: 250
  - Kidnapping: 78
  - Barricade and Hostage: 65
  - Bombing: 44
  - Armed Assault or Ambush: 19
  - Hijacking (Air and Non-Air): 13
  - Assassination: 14
  - Incendiary Attack or Arson: 12

## USSR/Eastern Europe
- Total: 19
  - Kidnapping: 2
  - Barricade and Hostage: 1
  - Bombing: 15
  - Armed Assault or Ambush: 1

## Pacific and Australia
- Total: 8
  - Kidnapping: 4
  - Barricade and Hostage: 1
  - Bombing: 1

## Transregional
- Total: 1
  - Kidnapping: 1

*Mass letter bomb mailing.
### International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents Directly Affecting US Citizens, Corporations, or Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Kidnap</th>
<th>B &amp; H</th>
<th>Bomb</th>
<th>Ass'lt</th>
<th>Hijack 1</th>
<th>Assass.</th>
<th>Incend.</th>
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1 Excludes numerous non-terrorist skyjackings, many of which victimized US planes or citizens.

2 This figure does not, of course, reflect more than a score of cases in which ransom demands were levied on—or were eventually at least partially satisfied by—U.S. corporations or private citizens.
### International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents by Regional Origin of the Perpetrators—1968–1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Kidnap</th>
<th>B &amp; H</th>
<th>Bomb</th>
<th>Ass’lt</th>
<th>Hijack</th>
<th>Assass.</th>
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### International and Transnational Terrorist Incidents—Fedayeen and Non-Fedayeen by Year: 1968–1975

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<th>Non-Fedayeen</th>
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<td>37</td>
<td>913</td>
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1 Includes the sole transnational terrorist attack on a nuclear installation during the period under review—the 1975 bombing of a nuclear power facility in France by the Puig Antich-Ulrike Meinhof Commando. It bears note, however, that Argentina’s ERP did briefly occupy an unfinished Argentine nuclear power plant in March 1973, an act which falls in the category of domestic terrorism.

2 Includes the only two incidents in which a chemical, biological, or radiological agent has been used to induce terror to date (the radio-active iodine employed by the self-styled “Justice Guerrilla” in Austria in 1974).
Indiscriminate or High Casualty International or Transnational Terrorist Bombings and Armed Assaults by Regional Origin of the Perpetrators: 1968-1975

<table>
<thead>
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<td>Armed Assault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western and NATO Europe</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR/Eastern Europe</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific and Australia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown or Mixed</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>102</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indiscriminate or High Casualty International or Transnational Terrorist Bombings and Armed Assaults by Selected Groups 1968-75†

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Randomly-Selected</th>
<th>More than 10 Non-Terrorist Victimized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bombing</td>
<td>Armed Assault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSO: Black September Organization†</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA: Provisional Wing</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRA: Japanese Red Army</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFLP-CC: General Command</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslav Emigre Groups</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†When their overall record is taken into account, the listed groups appear to have been among the least inhibited with respect to the number, fate, or ostensible "guilt" of their victims.

Although the incident is not reflected in these statistics, the BSO is perhaps best known for the bloody barricade and hostage operation it staged in connection with the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich.

Indiscriminate or High Casualty International or Transnational Terrorist Bombings and Armed Assaults—Fedayeen and Non-Fedayeen: 1968-1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fedayeen or Fedayeen-related</th>
<th>Randomly-Determined</th>
<th>More than 10 Non-Terrorist Victimized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bombing</td>
<td>Armed Assault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fedayeen or Fedayeen-related</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Fedayeen</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>102</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>